mercoledì, Settembre 28, 2022

INTER-IN-DIPENDENZA E AUTONOMIA STRATEGICA

Il think tank CSIS pone un tema di grande rilevanza e interesse strategico: The adoption of the CHIPS and Science Act is a watershed in U.S. economic policy. It is not because the United States has never practiced industrial policy before; in fact, the early development of semiconductors and the internet was due in large part to Defense Department support. And the U.S. federal and local governments have provided episodic aid for a variety of sectors and companies. It feels, though, as if a new era is beginning in which government support to strengthen the competitiveness of industries—for reasons of business, national security, public health, and the environment—will be seen as more necessary and normal than in the past. But as a new era dawns, it is important to get right both the goals and tools of industrial policy so that it is effective and consistent with international commitments. Otherwise, this change will leave the U.S. economy worse off than before.

Ciò che sembra un paradosso non lo è. L’inter-in-dipendenza sistemica e l’autonomia strategica possono co-esistere. Il tema descritto da CSIS, come molti altri, ci porta in una riflessione che non può più attendere: le crescenti tensioni geostrategiche e la continua trasformazione dei rischi inducono ad alzare il livello d’immunizzazione, di difesa e a radicalizzarsi in una competizione lineare. Se l’immunizzazione è parte della visione politica dei sistemi nazionali, c’è un limite che non può essere superato. Non possiamo trasformare le relazioni internazionali in un’arena di scontri senza dialogo. Abbiamo, tutti insieme, la responsabilità della politica.

Ci sembra che un tema da affrontare strategicamente sia quello di una ri-fondazione della globalizzazione che conosciamo in glocalizzazione. In questa, infatti, gli Stati dovrebbero acquistare sempre meno rilevanza mentre il mondo potrebbe ri-pensarsi a partire dalle regioni come livelli necessari. Così, nei campi che fanno la differenza come la sostenibilità, la salute pubblica, la coesione e la giustizia sociale, l’innovazione tecnologica e la difesa, si potrebbero impostare nuove politiche pubbliche che abbiano il respiro della storia. Gli Stati nazionali non scomparirebbero, ovviamente, ma occorre considerare che la loro persistenza in termini di “soggetti burocratici” pesa non poco sulla possibilità di cambiare via. Questo passaggio, naturalmente, va approfondito perché ci chiama a rispondere a una domanda: a cosa servirà lo Stato nei prossimi decenni ?

Restando sul tema affrontato da CSIS, quello delle politiche tecnologiche a partire dai semiconduttori, Stati Uniti, Cina ed Europa saranno i nuovi poli d’attrazione. Attenzione, però: la ri-configurazione dei rapporti di forza non può prescindere dall’avvio di nuovi dialoghi strategici che, immaginando un mondo glocale, attuino mediazioni che tengano insieme, non solo tatticamente, inter-in-dipendenza (il vincolo che ci lega) e autonomia strategica (a livello regionale e continentale).

Inter-in-dependency and strategic autonomy

The CSIS think tank raises a topic of great importance and strategic interest: The adoption of the CHIPS and Science Act is a watershed in U.S. economic policy. It is not because the United States has never practiced industrial policy before; in fact, the early development of semiconductors and the internet was due in large part to Defense Department support. And the U.S. federal and local governments have provided episodic aid for a variety of sectors and companies. It feels, though, as if a new era is beginning in which government support to strengthen the competitiveness of industries — for reasons of business, national security, public health, and the environment — will be seen as more necessary and normal than in the past . But as a new era dawns, it is important to get right both the goals and tools of industrial policy so that it is effective and consistent with international commitments. Otherwise, this change will leave the U.S. economy worse off than before.

Systemic inter-in-dependence and strategic autonomy can co-exist: this is not a paradox. The theme described by CSIS, like many others, lead us to a reflection that can no longer wait: the growing geostrategic tensions and the continuous transformation of risks lead to raise the level of immunization, defense and to radicalize in a linear competition.

If immunization is part of the political vision of national systems, there is a limit that cannot be overcome. We cannot turn international relations into an arena of confrontation without dialogue. We all have a responsibility for politics. It seems to us that a theme to be addressed strategically is that of a re-foundation of the globalization we know in glocalization. In this, in fact, States should acquire less importance while the world could rethink itself starting from regions as necessary levels.

Thus, in the fields that make a difference such as sustainability, public health, cohesion and social justice, technological innovation and defense, new public policies, with the “breath” of history, could be set up. National states would not disappear, of course, but it must be considered that their persistence in terms of “bureaucratic subjects” weighs heavily on the possibility of changing paths. This passage, of course, must be deepened because it calls us to answer a question: what will be the role of the State in the coming decades?

Remaining on the theme addressed by CSIS, that of technological policies starting from semiconductors, the United States, China and Europe will be the new poles of attraction. Attention, however: the re-configuration of the balance of power cannot ignore the launch of new strategic dialogues which, imagining a glocal world, implement mediations that hold together, not only tactically, inter-in-dependence (the bond that binds us) and strategic autonomy (at regional level).

AROUND THE WORLD

Azerbaijan – Europe

  • August 8, 2022. Vasif Huseynov, The Jamestown Foundation. On July 18, the European Commission signed the new Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy with Azerbaijan to increase imports of Azerbaijani natural gas to Europe by at least 20 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually by 2027 (Ec.europa.eu, July 18). “Today … we are opening a new chapter in energy cooperation with Azerbaijan, a key partner in our efforts to move away from Russian fossil fuels,” said European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in a press conference with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Baku (Ec.europa.eu, July 18). “Issues of energy security today are more important than ever before” said President Aliyev, whose country exported 8.1 bcm to the EU in 2021—the first year after the launch of the Southern Gas Corridor, the pipeline through which Azerbaijani gas is carried to the European market. EU Energy Commissioner Kadri Simson added that Azerbaijan is “expected” to deliver an extra 4 bcm of gas to the European Union this year (bringing the total to 12 bcm) (Ec.europa.eu, July 18). For President von der Leyen, “This will help compensate for cuts in supplies of Russian gas and contribute significantly to Europe’s security of supply” (President.az, July 18). Azerbaijan and European Union Ink Deal on Strategic Partnership in Energy

Belarus

  • August 9, 2022. Grogry Ioffe, The Jamestown Foundation. In mid-July 2022, Moody’s and Fitch—two of the three international credit rating agencies—declared that Belarus is in technical default on its debt. Government economists consider this qualification politically prejudiced (Sputnik, July 13). However, a technical default is only a deficiency in a loan agreement that arises from a failure to uphold a certain aspect of the loan terms. In this case, Minsk proposed that it will pay in Belarusian rubles instead of US dollars. This proposition was extended on the grounds that Western sanctions imposed on Belarus prevent European banks from transferring payments from Belarusian banks to the actual owners of Belarus’s Eurobonds. This reportedly happened for the first time in February 2022 (Zerkalo.io, June 29). Belarus’s Economic Downturn

Europe

  • August 9, 2022. Paul Timmers, Brookings. Amid heightened geopolitical tensions and growing challenges posed by disruptive innovation, European policymakers are seeking ways to strengthen the continent’s strategic autonomy—particularly with respect to technology.  A key part of this effort is the EU Chips Act, which provides billions in financial support to set up factories for advanced chip production (so-called “fabs”) and step up semiconductor research in the EU. Just as U.S. policymakers are attempting to strengthen the American semiconductor industry via the CHIPS and Science Act signed into law on Tuesday, lawmakers in Europe are attempting to build a more independent technology industry. First put forward in April by the European Commission, the EU Chips Act aims to address semiconductor supply shortages and years of decline in semiconductor investment in the EU, boosting Europe’s share of global chip production capacity to 20% from its current level of about 10%. The act is expected to be adopted in the first half of 2023 and has already had an impact on major semiconductor companies’ investment decisions. How Europe aims to achieve strategic autonomy for semiconductors

Moldova

  • August 9, 2022. Vladimir Socor, The Jamestown Foundation. Moldova’s leftist-Russophile parties are surging in public opinion polls by blaming the multifaceted economic crisis on the country’s pro-Western authorities (see EDM, August 8). This ruthless demagogy is a contributing factor to the governing Party of Action and Solidarity‘s (PAS) deep slide in opinion polls. Pro-Russia Parties Resurgent in Moldova (Part Three)

Nagorno Karabakh 

  • August 9, 2022. Paul Globe, The Jamestown Foundation. The recent escalation of tensions in Karabakh has acquired a new and potentially destabilizing aspect, one that may matter far more in the future even if current clashes do not spark a new round of fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan. For the first time, Yerevan and Baku openly expressed anger about the role of Russian forces in Karabakh. Moscow describes these forces as peacekeepers even though they do not meet international standards in that regard, often act in a one-sided manner and fail to do more than only report violations of the ceasefire rather than actually keep the peace. Indeed, these forces’ behavior has been such that some observers have viewed them as creating a new Russian protectorate rather than acting as ostensibly intended (see EDM, January 21, 2021January 22, 2021January 26, 2021March 18, 2021March 22, 2021March 23, 2021). That Armenia has now joined Azerbaijan in criticizing Moscow on this point represents a major change in the positions of the two countries since Russian forces were inserted in the region on the basis of a trilateral declaration at the end of the 44-day war in 2020. Both Baku and Yerevan Angered by Russian Forces’ Failures in Karabakh

Russia – Turkey

  • August 8, 2022. Pavel K. Baev, The Jamestown Foundation. The meeting in Sochi, Russia, on August 5 between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was more than just another chapter in the long track record of bargaining and testing the limits of mutual patience between the two leaders. Putin’s war in Ukraine has badly damaged Russia’s international positions, and Erdogan can harvest benefits from transactional maneuvering in the margins of Moscow’s confrontation with the West. The Turkish president has become an indispensable interlocutor for the Russian leader, who has not received a habitual phone call from French President Emmanuel Macron since late May and only rarely is granted the privilege of a conversation with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Erdogan decided not to stay for dinner in Sochi and cancelled the planned joint press conference, which he usually enjoys for dropping a sensationalist remark or two, leaving commentators guessing about the real outcome of the four-hour talks (Kommersant, August 6). Erdogan and Putin Cordially Probe One Another’s Faults and Failure

Russia – Ukraine (on the ground & impact)

  • August 9, 2022. IAEA. Ukraine has informed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that a shelling incident on Saturday near the dry spent fuel storage facility at the country’s Zaporizhzya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) caused some damage, but that available radiation measurements continued to show normal levels at the site, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said today. Update 89 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine
  • August 9, 2022. Kateryna Stepanenko, Angela Howard, Katherine Lawlor, Karolina Hird, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan, ISW. The Ukrainian General Staff made no mention of Izyum in its 1800 situational report on August 9, nor did other prominent Ukrainian sources despite Western sources’ claims of an ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive in this area. This silence represents a noteworthy departure from previous Ukrainian coverage of the Kharkiv-Donetsk axis. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 9

Taiwan

  • August 2022. Michael E. O’Hanlon, Brookings. Military analysts often use modeling to predict specific outcomes in war, including winners and losers, casualties, territorial gains or losses, and combat duration. But a potential U.S.-China war over Taiwan, likely also involving some American allies, poses analytical and policy challenges that make predicting outcomes especially difficult. In particular, the outcome of a Chinese maritime blockade of Taiwan scenario, in which a U.S.-led coalition aids Taiwan’s military to break the blockade and keep the island polity economically viable, may be too close to call. Can China take Taiwan? Why no one really knows

USA

  • August 9, 2022. Breaking Defense. The CHIPS Act has been hailed by supporters as a game-changing piece of legislation in the microelectronics tug-of-war between the US and China. But is it a revolution, or is it just a starting point? In this new op-ed, Alan Shaffer, Mike Fritz and Bob Hummel of the Potomac Institute lay out how much more work there is to do. The CHIPS Act has passed. Now comes the hard work
  • August 9, 2022. Alexander Kersten, Gregory Arcuri, Gabrielle Athanasia, Hideki Uno, CSIS. The CHIPS and Science Act of 2022, known colloquially as CHIPS+—signed into law by President Biden on August 9—combines the science provisions of the House’s America COMPETES Act of 2022 with the Senate’s U.S. Innovation and Competition Act (USICA), which have been under negotiation in a bicameral conference committee since May 2022. A Look at the CHIPS-Related Portions of CHIPS+
  • August 9, 2022. Aidan Arasasingham, Gerard DiPippo, CSIS. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) released its unclassified Annual Report to Congress for 2021 on August 2, 2022. The first comprehensive review of expanded CFIUS activities authorized by the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA), this new report sheds light on the evolving role that inbound investment screening plays in the U.S. economic security toolkit. Significant growth in the number of CFIUS notice filings, covered notice reviews, and investigations suggest a future where U.S. economic security concerns will continue to intersect with cross-border financial and technological flows, particularly with China. Evaluating CFIUS in 2021
  • August 9, 2022. Shelly J. Lundberg and Dick Startz, Brookings. The recent Dobbs decision by the Supreme Court, which overturned half a century of abortion rights, will affect wide areas of society, and higher education will be no exception. The impacts on higher education will fall into (at least) five areas: reduced college enrollment, particularly for Black women; disruption of training in medical schools; changes in on-campus student health services; reductions in out-of-state enrollment in anti-abortion states; and shifts in faculty location decisions away from anti-abortion states. For some of these issues, existing research provides a useful guide to likely outcomes. Other outcomes will take time to unfold and depend on how anti-abortion restrictions and enforcement evolve in individual states, but informed guesses are possible. The end of Roe creates new challenges in higher education
  • August 9, 2022. Cameron F. Kerry, Brookings. For the first time ever, a congressional committee teed up a comprehensive information privacy bill for a floor vote. On July 20, the House Committee on Energy & Commerce reported out the bipartisan American Data Privacy and Protection Act (ADPPA) by a lopsided 53-2 vote. This bill is the product of a “three corners” compromise among the Democratic chairs and ranking Republicans on the full committee and key subcommittee in the House and the ranking Republican on the counterpart Senate Committee on Science, Commerce & Transportation. Senator Cantwell and Democrats should accept a privacy victory gracefully

TOPICS

Cybersecurity – Defense – Military – Security – Space

Education

  • August 9, 2022. Thomas Poulsen, World Bank blogs. Even before COVID-19, the world was facing a learning crisis, with nearly 6 out of every 10 ten-year-olds in low- and middle-income countries (LICs and MICs) suffering from learning poverty—meaning they were unable to read and understand a simple story. Now COVID-19-related school closures and disruptions have deepened the crisis, sharply increasing learning poverty and exacerbating the inequalities in education. Declining financial resources for mounting learning poverty could spell disaster for millions of children

Global Economy

  • August 9, 2022. John BaffesWee Chian Koh, World Bank blogs. Precious metals prices have softened after their March 2022 highs. The recent weakness reflects rising interest rates and the strengthening of the U.S. dollar, which have outweighed inflation risks. Gold prices have been relatively more resilient, supported by robust central bank purchases, but were weighed down by soft consumer and investment demand. Silver prices slumped on waning industrial demand. Platinum prices plunged due to weak autocatalyst demand, while palladium prices have been particularly volatile reflecting the impact of the war in Ukraine. Precious metal prices are anticipated to face headwinds throughout the rest of 2022, driven by monetary policy tightening and further economic weakness. But resurfacing geopolitical tensions and persistently high inflation could provide some reprieve. Precious metal prices pressured by rising interest rates and weaker economic activity

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