giovedì, Maggio 30, 2024



  • August 25, 2022. Theresa Hitchens, Breaking Defense. China is now “on track” to outpace the United States as the leading space power by 2045, according to the latest version of the space industrial base workshop report spearheaded in part by the Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Unit. A reason for this pessimistic viewpoint is a collective “a lack of urgency” across the US government and industry, as well as a bureaucratic environment “that is constructively delaying U.S. commercial progress through regulatory burden,” states the report, “State of the Space Industrial Base: Winning the New Space Race for Sustainability, Prosperity and the Planet.”. China sprinting ahead as a space power while US lacks ‘urgency,’ new report frets



  • August 25, 2022. Yingyi MaRyan Hass, and Jude Blanchette, Brookings. In the fourth episode of “Vying for Talent,” Dr. Yingyi Ma, a professor of sociology at the Maxwell School at Syracuse University, shares her perspective on how China’s talent base is shaped by the nation’s educational landscape as well as social and political challenges.  In discussion with hosts Ryan Hass and Jude Blanchette, Dr. Ma lays out strengths and weaknesses of China’s human talent development pipeline and shares why she remains confident in the competitive advantages of America’s higher education system. Strengths and weaknesses of China’s national human capital development
  • August 24, 2022. Kenton Thibaut, Atlantic Council. As China’s military and economic power has grown, so has its ambition to shape global norms to suit its priorities. China believes that the United States currently dominates the international system, and sees growing Western opposition to China as evidence that the current order is now a threat to the continued security of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). As such, China’s leadership has come to see its ability to reshape the international order—or, at least, to decenter US power within it—as essential to the party’s future. Chinese discourse power: Ambitions and reality in the digital domain


  • August 24, 2022. Alex Engler, Brookings. The regulation of general-purpose AI (GPAI) is currently being debated by the European Union’s legislative bodies as they work on the Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA). One proposed change from the Council of the EU (the Council) would take the unusual, and harmful, step of regulating open-source GPAI. While intended to enable the safer use of these tools, the proposal would create legal liability for open-source GPAI models, undermining their development. This could further concentrate power over the future of AI in large technology companies and prevent research that is critical to the public’s understanding of AI. The EU’s attempt to regulate open-source AI is counterproductive

Russia – Ukraine (on the ground & impact)

  • August 25, 2022. Patrick Tucker, Defense One. Many have speculated that recent strikes on Russian bases in Crimea are the start of a much-anticipated Ukrainian counter-offensive aimed at regaining territory lost since the February invasion. But experts say the attacks are more likely a bid to prevent Russian forces from resupplying or further advancing. Ukraine’s Strikes Are Setting the Stage for a Rough Russian Winter
  • August 25, 2022.
  • August 25, 2022. Karolina Hird, Layne Philipson, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan, ISW. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s August 25 decree to increase the size of the Russian military starting in January 2023 is unlikely to generate significant combat power in the near future and indicates that Putin is unlikely to order a mass mobilization soon.The decree increases the nominal end strength of the Russian Armed Forces by 137,000 military personnel, from 1,013,628 to 1,150,628, starting on January 1, 2023. The Russian military likely seeks to recover losses from its invasion of Ukraine and generate forces to sustain its operation in Ukraine. The announcement of a relatively modest (yet likely still unattainable) increased end strength target strongly suggests that Putin remains determined to avoid full mobilization. The Kremlin is unlikely to generate sufficient forces to reach an end strength of over 1,150,000 soldiers as the decree stipulates. The Russian military has not historically met its end-strength targets. It had only about 850,000 active-duty military personnel in 2022 before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, for example, well shy of its nominal end strength target of over one million. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 25
  • August 25, 2022. H. Andrew Schwartz, Seth G. Jones, CSIS. CSIS’s Seth Jones joins the podcast to assess Ukraine after six months of war with Russia, plus, the assassination of Russian nationalist Daria Dugina, and Winter is coming.  Six Months of War in Ukraine


USA – Africa

USA – China

  • August 25, 2022. Ilaria Mazzocco, CSIS. Legislative action to compete with China seems to have defined the summer in Washington this year. The CHIPS and Science Act aims to revive semiconductor manufacturing in the United States to address the risks that come from having so much manufacturing capacity concentrated in Taiwan and the gradual rise of China’s own chip production abilities. Why the New Climate Bill Is Also about Competition with China


Climate change & sustainability

Defense, Military, Security, Cybersecurity

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